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FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO., FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, JOHN MARK BANGERTER;
BONNEVILLE ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL SYSTEMS, INC. (Respondent);
COLONIAL LUMBER, INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY (Appellant),
Defendants.
JOHN MARK BANGERTER,

Third-PaHy Plaintiff,
V.

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY; CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES; TRUCK
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP,
Third-Party Defendants.
Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, Utah
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Presiding
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
FAIRWAY LIMITED AND FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant-Appellant, Diehl Lumber Company (Diehl or Diehl Lumber) brings
this appeal from a final judgment of the District Court. The Utah Supreme court has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented are:
1.

Whether the District Court properly exercised its discretion in

permitting plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a strict liability count before trial
pursuant Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where Diehl Lumber knew of
plaintiff's intent to plead strict liability and was not unavoidably prejudiced in any way
by the amendment.
2.

Whether the jury's finding that Diehl Lumber was a broker of lumber

roof trusses is supported by substantial evidence where the record shows:
—

that Diehl established separate sales categories for the brokered sale
of lumber products, and specifically the "brokerage sale of roof
trusses";

—

that Diehl was promoting the sale of roof trusses manufactured by
Truss Teck, Inc. — a company owned and operated by the son of the
president of Diehl Lumber;
that Diehl collected a fee of at least 5% on any sales of roof trusses
manufactured by Truss Teck;
that almost half of Diehl's gross revenues were derived from its
brokerge business;
that Diehl exclusively handled the billing for all truss sales on its own
invoices;
that Diehl's own chief financial officer admitted that in 1979, Diehl
was a broker of roof trusses and was brokering trusses for "primarily
Truss Teck, Inc."

3.

Whether Diehl Lumber is liable to plaintiffs for their damages caused

by defective roof trusses under the doctrine of strict liability in tort where Diehl
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actively participated in the chain of distribution that carried Truss Teck's roof trusses to
end users?
4.

Whether the trial Court properly instructed the jury as to the law of

strict liability in tort, as that law is applied nationwide?
5.

Whether the trial court properly allowed plaintiff's to introduce

relevant evidence of Diehl's gross revenues and Diehl's special relationship with Truss
Teck, Inc. in order to establish its strict liability claim?
6.

Whether the jury's verdict that Truswal was not at fault is supported by

substantial evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Preliminary
The statement of facts presented by Diehl Lumber is incomplete in several
material respects. For instance, Diehl omits any reference to tne testimony of its chief
financial officer, Bruce Hiller, that:
He understood the concept of a brokered sale within the lumber
industry, and
Diehl was primarily brokering trusses for Truss Teck in 1979.
The following additional facts are therefore pertinent.
The Parties
Plaintiff Fairway Distributing Company is a distributor of food products,
which were stored in a warehouse located at 100 N. 600 West Street in Farmington,
Utah.

(Tr. 68, 414)

Fairway Distributing.

Plaintiff Fairway, Ltd. owned this warehouse and leased it to
(Tr. 69)

Plaintiffs purchased this warehouse in 1982 from

defendant Bangerter. (Tr. 423) Bangerter built the warehouse in 1979 with component
parts, including a roof truss system purchased from defendant Colonial Lumber. (PI. Exh.
6, R. 1570)

Colonial was in the retail lumber business; it acquired the roof trusses

through Diehl Lumber — a wholesaler and broker of lumber products.
-2-

(Tr. 117, 145,

344) The roof trusses were manufactured by Truss Teck, Inc. (Tr. 306-09, Df. Exh. 1, R.
1570) Defendant Truswal Systems, Inc. (Truswal) makes barbed plates which, along with
a design, are sold for use in the manufacturing of roof trusses. (Tr. 212)
This is a strict liability case. The jury held Diehl Lumber strictly liable for
the damages plaintiffs suffered when the truss system failed, resulting in the collapse of
the roof over plaintiffs1 warehouse.
Diehl Lumber — A Predominant Presence
in the Intermountain Region Lumber Industry
Diehl Lumber has been in the lumber business since 1957 when Lawrence Diehl
started the company. (Tr. 293, 330) Diehl has 85 employees. It is engaged primarily in
the distribution and sale of wood products such as lumber and plywood, pine, cedar ,
laminated beams and flooring. (Tr. 330) Diehl sells its products throughout Utah and the
surrounding states, and on occasion in other states of the country. (Tr. 331) Diehl's gross
sales in 1979 totaled $39,000,000. (Tr. 331) As Lawrence Diehlfs son, Gary, stated —
Diehl Lumber has been in the business in this area "quite a while11 and "its a substantial
company with a well-established sales record". (Tr. 297)
A Major Portion of Diehl's Revenue
Was Derived From Its Brokerage Business
Diehl's chief financial officer, Bruce Hiller, testified that Diehl was in the
business of making three separate types of sales. Diehl's invoices contain a box entitled
"sales category". Depending upon the type of sale, Diehl would assign a "1", "2" or "3" to
the box entitled "sales category". (Tr. 344; PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570)
As explained by Hiller, category "one" constituted yard sales of lumber. (Tr.
344, 347) Under this category, Diehl made wholesale sales of lumber products to lumber
yards. (Tr. 354)
Category "two" constituted "brokerage sales of buildings products". (Tr. 344)
In this situation, a Diehl salesman would get an order for a particular product. He would
call a number of lumber mills to get bids on products. He would then find a price that he
-3-

liked, and quote the ultimate buyer the price. Diehl would then notify the manufacturer
to ship the goods directly to the buyer.

(Tr. 362)

Category

M

three,f constituted

"brokerage sales of trusses' 1 . (Tr. 344)
Diehl!s fees on its brokered sales of lumber products i.e., its gross profit,
ranged between 4% and 12%, depending upon market conditions and what its competition
was charging. (Tr. 359)
In 1979, approximately 35% to 50% of Diehl's gross revenue of $39,000,000
was derived from brokered sales. (Tr. 333)
Diehl Lumber Was Brokering Lumber Roof Trusses
In 1979 Primarily For a Company Called Truss Teck
Bruce Hiller understood the concept of a brokered sale "within the lumber
industry".

(Tr. 332-33)

"primarily Truss Teck."

He admitted that in 1979 Diehl was brokering trusses for
(Tr. 340) Diehl also delivered trusses made by Truss Teck on

occasion if asked to do so by the customer. (Tr. 339-41)
Truss Teck — A Fledgling Truss Manufacturing
Company Owned By Lawrence Diehl's Son
Which Grew Rapidly With the Help of Diehl Lumber
Truss Teck was a manufacturer of lumber roof trusses.

(Tr. 295)

This

company was started in 1978 by Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the president
of Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 292, 294-95)
Gary Diehl attended
accounting.

(Tr. 293)

the

University of

Utah for

two years

studying

He left college in 1977, and a year later at the age of 24 he

started up Truss Teck, becoming its first and only president. (Tr. 292, 294-95) Despite
having no previous background in engineering or the lumber and truss business, Gary
Diehl with the help of his father wanted to start getting "involved in the manufacture of
roof trusses":
Q.
A.

"Did you talk to your father, Lawrence Diehl, before you started Truss
Teck, Inc.?
Yeah. We talked quite a bit.
-4-

Q.

And did he offer to help you out in getting started in business?

A.

Well, he, like any other father, he offered to help with, you know,
anything he could do.

Q.

And that was certainly welcomed by you.

A.

Well, yes.

Q.

Well, it was. You wanted to get a business started.

A.

Yeah."

(Tr. 295, 297)
Truss Teck sold trusses all over Utah and surrounding states — the same sales
region in which Diehl sold lumber. (Tr. 300, 331) Many of Truss Teck's customers were
also customers of Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 298) This was so because, as Gary Diehl explained,
you canft make trusses without lumber and Diehl sold the lumber:
Q.

". . . you testified . . . that Diehl and Truss Teck shared some
customers. That's because you can't have a truss — make a roof
without the plywood, right?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And the people that bought trusses from you were retailing lumber
yards and hardware stores.

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And they are the same people that buy plywood from Diehl Lumber.

A,

That's correct."

(Tr. 320).
Truss Teck was in the truss manufacturing business from 1978 until 1982. In
1979, after only one year of operation, Truss Teck had gross sales of more than
$100,000. (Tr. 298-99)
(Tr. 299)

In another year, it generated over $200,000 in gross revenues.

During this time, as Bruce Hiller explained, Diehl Lumber was referring all

truss customers to Truss Teck. (Tr. 339-40)
The payment for any trusses manufactured by Truss Teck was also handled by
Diehl Lumber. After Truss Teck had manufactured trusses for a certain customer, such
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as a retailing lumber yard or hardware store, an invoice for payment was sent directly to
the customer by Diehl Lumber.

(Tr. 310-311; PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570) Payment was

made directly to Diehl Lumber for the truss system; no monies were received by Truss
Teck. (Tr. 311) Diehl would always deduct for itself a certain percentage of the gross
sales figure on the invoice and then remit the balance to Truss Teck. (Id.) Rather than
making an hourly charge, Diehl was taking a fee of 5% or "a little better" of the gross
sales figure on such invoices in 1979, regardless of the amount of the sale.

(Tr. 312,

358) Diehl used its own invoices in collecting payment for the trusses, instead of a Truss
Teck invoice. (PI. Exh. 11,12; R. 1570) These invoices, generated by Diehl Lumber, did
not give the customer any indication that Truss Teck manufactured the trusses. (Tr. 325;
PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570)
Diehl Later Took Over The Manufacturing
Of Trusses From Truss Teck
In early 1982, Truss Teck began to share office space with Diehl Lumber. (Tr.
296) Shortly thereafter Gary Diehl wanted "to just get out of the company". (Tr. 300)
Truss Teck sold its manufacturing equipment to Diehl Lumber; Diehl also retained "all
the records that related to any . . . roof truss manufacturing jobs that Truss Teck had
done". (Tr. 300-01) Gary Diehl became an employee of his father and was involved in
the manufacture of trusses under the Diehl corporate name, which Diehl sold as its own
product.

(Tr. 302) In 1984, after a further two year stint in the truss manufacturing

business with his father, Gary Diehl started another business, managing two tanning
salons. (Tr. 294)
Diehl Lumber Acted As A Broker Of The
Roof Trusses Used In The Construction
Of Plaintiffs' Warehouse In 1979
In 1979, Bangerter placed an order with Colonial Lumber for one flat truss
roof system which was used in the construction of the Fairway warehouse roof. (Tr. 119,
121-23; PI. Exh. 6, R. 1570)

This truss system was bought and sold by Colonial to

Bangerter through Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 116-17)
-6-

Rodney Gibson, a former Colonial partner and sales manager, testified that
Colonial sold different materials, including trusses, at retail. (Tr. 116) Gibson explained
that Colonial's products were purchased through Diehl Lumber:
Q.

,f

. . . Did you have a contract with Diehl Lumber?

A*

x es. . . •

Q.

And did you acquire lumber and trusses through Diehl Lumber (in
1979)?
* *

A«

*

(In) 1979 we were buying lumber and plywood from Diehl Lumber. We
were invoiced on trusses through Diehl Lumber.
* *

*

Q.

Did you have, in the f79 period, did you ever receive an invoice from
Truss Teck?

A,

I never received an invoice from Truss Teck .
* * *

[T]he trusses and lumber were bought through Diehl Lumber."
(Tr. 117).
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 is a Diehl invoice showing the sale of the roof trusses to
Colonial Lumber on July 31, 1979. (PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570) The invoice bears the number
"27605", and indicates that this sale of trusses fell into "sales category three" — which is
the category used by Diehl Lumber for the brokered sale of roof trusses. (Id., Tr. 344)
Bruce Hiller explained that Diehl acted as a broker in the sale of these trusses:
Q,

". . . [T]here were some trusses sold to Colonial Lumber in accordance
with the Exhibit No. (11) which has an invoice date of July 31, 1979,
Invoice No. 27605. Now describe for me the process that would have
taken place in the ordering of that and how Diehl Lumber ordered and
where they got the trusses from and how the order was filled and the
billing.
* *

A.

*

To the best of my knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979, if
an order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to of
gone to another company such as one who manufactured trusses. That
company would deliver them.
We would broker trusses for a
company and do the billing and sometimes ship trusses in our trucks
with other materials as a convenience and take a broker commission
only. . . .

Q.

So if someone called you, say, Colonial Lumber called and wanted to
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would
then refer them to another company?

A.

We would refer them to the manufacturer.

Q.

In this instance who were you brokering trusses for in 1979?

A.

Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc."

(Tr. 339-40)
The Manufacture of Roof Trusses
In manufacturing trusses, Truss Teck ordinarily used engineering designs and
truss plates from truss designers/engineers. (Tr. 303) Truss Teck's staff would use the
designs and plates to construct the trusses by using machinery to exert pressure so as to
attach the steel connection plates to the lumber and compress them together. (Tr. 308)
The resulting product was a roof truss.
In 1979, Truss Teck used Truswal plates. Truss Teck purchased these plates
and stocked them in standard sizes. When Truss Teck was manufacturing a truss for a
customer, it would call Truswal which would provide an engineering drawing or diagram
to be used in the manufacture of the trusses.

(Tr. 307-08, 312-13) Truss Teck used

Truswal plates in its construction of the roof trusses for the Fairway warehouse (Tr. 214)
The Collapse of the Roof — Caused
For the Most Part by "Sloppy Fabrication"
Of the Trusses by Truss Teck
The roof of the Fairway warehouse collapsed on January 24, 1984. (Tr. 2)
Immediately after this collapse, plaintiffs retained Mr. Arnold Coon to investigate the
cause of the roof failure.

(Tr. 180)

Mr. Coon received his degree in structural

engineering from the University of Utah, and is a recognized expert in this field. He had
been a senior partner in the firm of Coon & King Engineering, and was personally
involved in the structural design of several buildings at the University of Utah, Brigham
Young University, Utah State University and other buildings worldwide. Mr. Coon has
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investigated a large number of roof failures, similar to the roof failure occurring at the
Fairway warehouse. (Tr. 174-76, 181).
Mr. Coon's investigation revealed two causes for the roof failure. First, the
steel plates used during manufacturing to connect the lumber to form a truss were not
large enough and secondly, the steel plates were improperly placed upon the wood
members during manufacturing.

(Tr. 192-93).

For example, Mr. Coon was shown

plaintiffs 1 Exhibit 39 — an end of one of the trusses taken from the scene of the
collapse.

(Tr. 190) Mr. Coon opined that the misplacement of the steel plates on this

truss was a significant cause leading to the failure of the truss system and the collapse of
the roof:
"This 2x4 has a finish of 3 and 1/2 inches. If these plates (had) been put in
according to the code and EPI standards, the plate would have been exactly on
the center of the 2x4 and there would have been a quarter of an inch of wood
showing on either side of it."
"The fact that this (plate) was put on askew caused some secondary stresses
that were significant . . . many times the misplacement of plates is a thing
that triggers collapse. . . ."
(Tr. 192)
During his investigation Mr. Coon also took photographs of the trusses. (Tr.
194; PI. Exh. 15-38, R. 1570)

Mr. Coon examined these photographs opining that the

trusses were poorly manufactured:
—

The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 37 shows that the plate was offcenter indicating "an element of sloppiness and poor quality control in
the fabrication of the trusses". (Tr. 197);

—

The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 38 shows that the plate had been
placed much lower than it should have been and only a very small area
of the plate is making a connection — "I have experienced failures that
have occurred as a result of that sloppy type of fabrication." (Tr. 198);

—

The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 23 shows that the plate "missed
the piece of wood altogether which, again, indicates the sloppy
fabrication." (Tr. 202-03)

Diehl's expert, Mr. Vance Christensen found Mr. Coon's report on the roof's
collapse "very informative" and agreed in large part with it. (Tr. 405) Mr. Christensen
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agreed that the misplacement of the plates by the truss manufacturer "does have an
effect. It certainly does." (Tr. 391-92)
Even Gary Diehl, whose firm manufactured these trusses, agreed they were
sloppily made. Mr. Diehl was shown plaintiffs1 Exhibit 39 — part of the roof truss taken
from the scene of the collapse — and admitted that the plates were misplaceds "I can
see quite a bit wrong with that." (Tr. 323)
Plaintiffs1 Complaint
Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 27, 1984, against Diehl Lumber
and other parties.

(R. 2-9)

The complaint charged Diehl with breaching its implied

warranty concerning the fitness of the roof trusses, and negligently supervising their
installation. (R. 4-6) Plaintiffs sought damages for the destruction of their building and
its contents. (R. 2-9)
Plaintiffs Sought To Amend Their Complaint
8 Months After Bringing Their Action
On July 19, 1985, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint for the reason
that discovery showed that additional parties and an additional claim should have been
added to the complaint. (R. 163-65) Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint along with
their motion seeking to add an eighth claim sounding in strict liability against all
defendants.

(R. 163-65, 167-77)

Plaintiffs also sought to add their insurer, American

Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, as an additional plaintiff, and John Mark
Bangerter, d/b/a Bangerter Construction Corporation, J.C. Bangerter & Sons, Inc., and
Bangerter Development Corporation as additional defendants. (R. 163-65, 167)
Diehl did not object to plaintiffs1 motion to add strict liability. (R. 240; Tr. of
6/23/87, at 32) In fact, on August 30, 1985 Diehl filed a cross-claim against Colonial
seeking recovery from Colonial if Diehl was held liable to plaintiffs under strict liability:
"Any liability of (Diehl) to plaintiffs is derivative to liability created by the
manufacturer of the trusses which are the subject of plaintiffs' complaint,
which manufacturer is Colonial Lumber, Inc., because this defendant acted, if
at all, only as an intermediate purchaser-seller in the chain of distribution.
-10-

(R. 242) (emphasis supplied)
Only the new defendants plaintiffs sought to name objected to being named as
parties. (R. 180-83, 188-89) Because of these objections, the Court ordered plaintiffs to
file factual statements showing the necessity for additional parties. (R. 240)

Plaintiffs

later decided not to name additional parties and, therefore, did not file
statements.

these

(R. 550) Because these factual statements were not filed, the trial court

denied plaintiffs1 motion on September 12, 1985. (R. 245) However, since neither the
court nor any of the defendants objected to the strict liability count, plaintiffs believed
that "the motion relative to the strict liability (count) had been granted and was in the
case." (Tr. of 6/23/87 at 33)
Plaintiffs1 Second Motion
To Amend The Complaint
The trial of this cause was initially set for July 29, 1987. (R. 306) Before
trial, plaintiffs discovered that no formal order had been entered granting them leave to
add the strict liability claim. (Tr. of 6/23/87 at 33) Plaintiffs immediately brought this
matter to the court's attention on June 17, 1987, seeking relief under Rule 60, and
alternatively under Rule 15(a) to amend their complaint to add strict liability. (R. 54851) This time, Diehl objected claiming that it would be prejudiced by the amendment.
(R. 739) Diehl further claimed that the strict liability count lacked merit because Diehl
did not sell trusses, but "simply referred the buyer to a seller, took a commission and
handled the accounting." (R. 748) Diehl's counsel expanded on this point at the hearing
on plaintiffs1 motion to amend by stating:
"Diehl would send out an invoice to Truss Teek's customer to collect it and the
reason that they did that . . . is very simple. Two things. One, is that it was a
matter of convenience for all concerned. Nobody buys trusses without buying
plywood. You have to have something to put on it to make a roof. You don't
have trusses over our head and Diehl Lumber sold plywood, Truss Teck did
not. So, Diehl Lumber would sell the plywood, add it to their invoice, add
trusses to the invoice and collect the whole thing and remit Truss Teek's share
to Truss Teck."
(Tr. of 6/23/87 at 40)
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After hearing arguments on this motion, Judge Cornaby allowed plaintiffs to
file their amended complaint, stating that "the intent of the court was not to prevent the
plaintiff from being heard on the legitimate cause of action." (R. 753) The court also
rescheduled the trial date, giving defendants three additional months, until October 28,
1987, to prepare for trial. (R. 754)
Diehl's Motion for Summary Judgment
In the interim between the amendment of the complaint and trial, Diehl
conducted no additional discovery in order to prepare its defense on strict liability. (See
R. 756-1330) Instead, Diehl filed a motion for summary judgment on the strict liability
claim. (R. 850-51)
Plaintiffs opposed this motion on the grounds that:
Diehl acted as a full-service broker of trusses and was therefore an
active party in the chain of distribution of those trusses;
Diehl could be held strictly liable for plaintiffs1 damages pursuant to
the doctrine of successor liability.
(R. 896-909)
The trial court denied Diehl's motion for summary judgment on October 27,
1987, stating:
"I cannot tell from what has been given me whether . . . its strictly
bookkeeping, just a service to Truss Teck, or is it a brokerage? I see it as a
question of fact. It's along with the successor liability. I think both of those
are things that bring it into question that you are going to have to present to a
jury and the jury is going to have to make the decision. So, the motion for
summary judgment is not appropriate."
(Tr. of 10/27/87 at 15)
THE TRIAL
Plaintiffs1 Impeachment of Bruce Hiller —
The High Point of the Trial
Plaintiffs called Bruce Hiller, Diehl's chief financial officer, to describe
Diehl's role in the distribution of the trusses used in the construction of the Fairway
warehouse roof. (Tr. 328-45) Hiller attempted, during his testimony, to minimize Diehl's
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role in the distribution of these trusses. For example, Hiller was asked:
Q.

". . . [I]n 1979 when Diehl Lumber Products got an inquiry from a
customer for a roof truss system, somebody called you and said I need
roof trusses for a commercial building. In 1979 Diehl Lumber Products
was routing all those customers and all those roof truss sales to Truss
Teck for manufacturing by Truss Teck, correct?"

Hiller answered:
A.
(Tr. 337)

"I donft have a personal knowledge of that because I never got involved
in the sales end of the business.11

With the Court's permission, plaintiffs were allowed to publish Hiller's prior

deposition testimony to the jury.
In his prior deposition, Hiller described Diehl's actual role in the distribution
of trusses.

With respect to plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, showing the sale of the roof trusses

from Diehl to Colonial, Hiller affirmatively testified:
that Diehl was "a broker of trusses";
—

that "in 1979 if an order for trusses was called from a customer it
would have had to have gone to another company such as one who
manufactured trusses";

—

that Diehl "would broker trusses for a company and do the billing and
sometimes ship trusses in our trucks with other materials as a
convenience and take a broker commission";
that if Colonial Lumber called and wanted to buy trusses from Diehl,
Diehl "would refer them to the manufacturer";

—

that in 1979 Diehl Lumber was brokering trusses for "primarily, Truss
Teck, Inc."

(Tr. 338-40).
Similarly, Hiller attempted to downplay the fact that Diehl had established an
entire separate sales category for the brokered sale of trusses.

Hiller was asked the

following questions with respect to plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 12:
Q*

". . . [0]n both exhibits there is an item called 'sales category' and
there is a number '3' in there. Doesn't the No. 3 stand for brokered sale
of trusses?

A,

It stands for sale of trusses.

Q.

Stands for a brokered sale of trusses, doesn't it?
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A.

There is no differentiation made between a sale of trusses and a
brokerage sale of trusses. Truss sales were put in that category three."

(Tr. 341-42).
Again, with the permission of the Court, plaintiffs were allowed to publish
Hiller's deposition testimony in which he affirmatively stated that Diehl had established
three separate sales categories — category "3" being brokerage sales of trusses:
Q.

"Is category three trusses or is that broker items or what are the
different categories, 1-2-3? What do they stand for?

A.

Category one would have been yard sales. Category two would have
been brokerage sales of building products. Category three would have
been brokerage sales of trusses.

(Tr. 344)
Diehl Produced No Direct Evidence Showing
That Truswal Was At Fault
Diehl was able to fully litigate the issue of Truswal's fault at trial.

Diehl

simply failed to produce any direct evidence that Truswal provided Truss Teck with any
design, much less an erroneous one, for the manufacture of the roof truss system. Diehl's
own expert, Vance Christensen, made this clear by explaining that he had never seen nor
reviewed any "design drawings that were . . . sent by any engineering firm to" Truss
Teck. (Tr. 408) Despite the absence of a design, Diehl attempted to build a case against
Truswal on the basis of belief, not evidence.
For example, Diehl's expert, Vance Christensen, contended he was able to give
an opinion on who the design firm was and what they did or did not do notwithstanding
the absence of a design:
Q.

". . . Now you indicated that you have never seen any design drawings
that were actually used.

A.

That is correct. I have not.

Q.

That were actually sent by any engineering firm to the company that
built the trusses.

A.

No.
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Q.

Therefore, you could not give an opinion on what the design firm that
sold the plan did or did not do.

A.

I feel that I can give an opinion, yes, sir.

Q.

You are prepared to give an opinion on what a design firm did even if
you have not seen their work?

A.

The standards in the industry.
* * *

Q.

You are prepared to give an opinion on the conduct of a company
without looking at their plans?

A.

Yes.

<}•

What is that opinion?

A.

That opinion is that the standard practice of persons furnishing
manufactured products is to furnish designs along with those
products. . . ."

(Tr. 408).
Unlike Christensen, Mr. Arnold Coon would not render an opinion on matters
that he had no knowledge of. For example, Mr. Coon was not prepared to give an opinion
that Truswal furnished Truss Teck with design information because he had no firsthand
knowledge of it. Also, he was not prepared to give an opinion that if Truswal supplied
design information to Truss Teck, that the design information was actually used by Truss
Teck in fabricating the trusses. (Tr. 277)
Mr. Coon did testify however, that in his 39 years as a structural engineer, he
has never seen a design drawing by a design firm "that tells somebody to do a half-way
job." (Tr. 277-28) Mr. Coon found "it certainly is a possibility" that a truss manufacturer
could use Truswal plates, but not their design. (Tr. 278)
Diehl Granted A Directed Verdict
On Successor Liability
At the close of plaintiffs1 case, Diehl moved for a directed verdict on both
strict liability and successor liability. (Tr. 363) The trial Court denied this motion with
respect to strict liability, but granted it on successor liability. (Tr. 368)
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The Jury Instructions
The trial court charged the jury with respect to the law of strict products
liability as follows:
"The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as
all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable for damages
caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long as the party is in
the business of, and gains profit from, distributing or otherwise disposing of
the product in question through the stream of commerce. The primary
justification for extending strict liability to all in the chain of distribution is
to provide the 'maximum of protection 1 to the consumer. This policy is as
applicable to those who never handle or control the product, as it is to those
who do possess or control the product. In either case, consumer protection is
the ultimate factor considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of
the product is not a prerequisite to the imposition of strict liability."
(R. 1349)
At the instructions conference, Diehl raised only three objections to this
instruction.

First, Diehl objected to that portion of the instruction stating that the

primary justification
consumer.

of strict liability was "the maximum of protection" to the

Secondly, Diehl objected to that portion which stated that the policy

underlying strict liability was applicable to those who never handle or control the
product. (Tr. 50) Finally, Diehl objected to that portion of the instruction which charged
that consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered.

Diehl claimed that these

portions misstated the law. (Tr. 450-51)
The trial court also gave the jury the following instruction on the term
"broker":
Definition of Broker: An agent employed to make bargains and contracts for
compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person whose
business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and sellers of goods
and negotiators between buyers and seller, but without having custody of the
property.
(R. 1360) Diehl did not object to this instruction, stating "(we) don't have a problem with
the definition of broker except that we don't think brokerage is good enough to meet
strict liability." (Tr. 452)
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The Jury's Verdict
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor
of plaintiffs and against Diehl.

(R. 1375-77)

Pursuant to a special verdict, the jury

found, in pertinent part:
—

that Diehl was not merely a bookkeeper for Truss Teck for the truss
sale involved in this case;

—

that Diehl was a broker between Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for
the truss sale involved in this case.

(R. 1375-76). The jury awarded plaintiffs the amount of $75,000 as damages. (R. 1376)
This verdict of $75,000 was later reduced by the amount of $6,500 — the damages paid by
Truss Wall in settlement of plaintiffs1 claim.

On February 4, 1988, the trial court

entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Diehl on the balance of $68,500,
together with interest.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT THE CASE IN PERSPECTIVE
This is a strict liability case.

In order to hold Diehl responsible for the

damages they suffered due to the defective roof trusses, plaintiffs had the burden of
showing:
—

that the trusses were defective;

—

that the defects made the trusses unreasonably dangerous;

—

that these defects existed at the time the trusses left the control of
Diehl;

—

that plaintiffs were injured;

—

that the defects in the trusses were a proximate cause of plaintiffs1
injuries;
that Diehl participated in the chain of distribution of these roof
trusses. (R. 1351)

In rendering a verdict in the favor of plaintiffs and against Diehl, the jury found that
plaintiffs met their burden of proof.
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In its brief on appeal, Diehl does not challenge the juryfs verdict except for
one finding. Diehl expresses displeasure with the juryfs finding that it was a broker, and
it selectively edits the evidence to evade the application of strict liability.

Plaintiff's

respectfully submit that the case described by Diehl is not the case which was tried
below.
Diehl would "wish away" the deposition testimony of its chief
officer, Bruce Hiller.

financial

Hiller made clear that he understood the concept of a brokered

sale within the lumber industry as one in which Diehl would arrange the sale of a product
between the manufacturer and buyer, for a brokerage fee. (Tr. 332-33, 359, 362) Hiller's
testimony made clear that Diehl was brokering trusses in much the same way for
"primarily, Truss Teck, Inc." (Tr. 339-40)
Diehl does more than ignore this evidence; Diehl keeps hidden from this Court
the special relationship it had with Truss Teck — the company owned by Lawrence Diehl's
son. Diehl Lumber was helping Truss Teck get started in the business of manufacturing
trusses.

As Bruce Hiller further admitted, when a truss customer called upon Diehl

Lumber for trusses, it was Diehl's procedure to refer the customer to Truss Teck.
(Tr. 339-40) The evidence makes clear that Diehl was actively involved for profit in not
only brokering, but also marketing and distributing Truss Teck trusses.
The Courts in this nation have spoken: the rule of strict liability as embodied
in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to all parties who
participate in moving a defective product through the chain of production, marketing and
distribution. See, e.g., Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454
N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983) Diehl was such a party. The imposition of strict liability on Diehl
is justified on the ground that its position in the market process — indeed, its relationship
with Truss Teck — enabled it exert pressure on Truss Teck to enhance the safety of the
roof trusses. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d at 216 (1983).
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In an attempt to evade its responsibility to plaintiffs, Diehl raises a number
specious procedural claims.

For example, it erroneously contends that the trial Court

erred by allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add strict liability.

Plaintiffs

moved to amend their complaint well before trial pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that leave should be "freely given when justice
so requires." (U.R. Civ. Proc. 15(A)) The record makes clear the Diehl knew of plaintiffs
intent to plead strict liability, it knew what its defense to that claim would be, and was
not "unavoidably prejudiced" by the amendment.
Diehl also claims that the trial Court erred by allowing plaintiffs to introduce
relevant evidence of its gross revenues and its special relationship with Truss Teck. This
evidence was pertinent to plaintiffs' strict liability claim as it showed that Diehl actively
participated in the chain of distribution, and had the opportunity to influence Truss Teck
to build a good and safe truss. Indeed, Diehl makes no argument, whatsoever, showing
that this evidence was not relevant to plaintiffs1 claim.
Finally, Diehl makes certain claims regarding Truswal. These claims can have
no effect upon the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs1 and against Diehl, because the
verdict against Diehl is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the
law. However, Diehl's claims are without merit.
Diehl complains in its brief that "it had a contribution claim and expected to
have any judgment against it reduced by the greater of the amount Truswal's fault or the
amount paid by Truswal in settlement and expected to have Truswal's fault determined at
trial". (Applt. Br. p. 42) The record shows that Diehl got what it wanted. Diehl was able
to fully litigate Truswal's fault at trial.
evidence that Truswal was at fault.

Diehl simply failed to produce any direct

It was correct therefore for the jury to find that

Truswal was not at fault.
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ARGUMENT
L
THE DECISION ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT
BEFORE TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 15(A) RESTED WITH THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. DIEHL'S BURDEN IN
ATTEMPTING TO SET ASIDE THAT DECISION IS INSURMOUNTABLE.
At the outset it must be noted that in an effort at misdirection, Diehl devotes
substantial argument to the claim that plaintiffs' June 17, 1987 motion to amend their
complaint to add a strict liability count was improperly granted under Rules 60(a) and (b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While plaintiffs1 motion sought relief under Rule
60, they alternatively sought leave to amend under Rule 15(a) which permits amendments
and requires that leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." (U.R.
Civ. Proc. 15(a) (R. 548-51) The order allowing the amendment makes clear the Court
was acting pursuant to its authority under Rule 15(a) and not Rule 60. It is therefore
under Rule 15(a) that the order must be reviewed.
The principles of law governing the application of Rule 15(a) are not subject
to challenge. "The rule in this state has always been to allow amendments freely where
justice requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d
165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) (emphasis applied). The decision to grant leave to amend
lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, and its rulings cannot be disturbed
absent a showing of abuse of discretion resulting in "unavoidable prejudice" to the
complaining party. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983).
The record, which Judge Cornaby reviewed in allowing plaintiffs 1 motion,
shows that after the complaint was filed on November 27, 1984, plaintiffs learned
through discovery that other parties and another count sounding in strict liability should
have been added to the complaint. Plaintiffs immediately moved to amend the complaint
on July 19, 1985 — eight months after the initial filing. Diehl had notice of Plaintiffs
intent to plead strict liability, but did not object.

Only the new defendants plaintiffs

sought to name objected to being named as parties.
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(R. 180-83, 188-89)

The court

ordered plaintiffs to file factual statements justifying additional parties, but — and this
is significant — the Court did not require plaintiffs to further substantiate the strict
liability count. Plaintiffs later decided not to name additional parties, and therefore did
not file the factual statements.

(R. 550) Because these factual statements were not

filed, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion on September 12, 1985. (R. 245) However,
since neither the defendants, nor for that matter the court, objected to the strict
liability count, plaintiffs believed that the portion of their motion to add strict liability
had been allowed. (Tr. of June 23, 1987 at 32)
Before trial, plaintiffs discovered that no formal order was entered granting
them leave to add strict liability.

Plaintiffs immediately brought this matter to the

court's attention on June 17, 1987, seeking only to add the strict liability count which
plaintiff's believed had been added earlier. Judge Cornaby allowed this amendment, and
for good reason. His Honor explained that it was never his intention in earlier denying
the motion "to prevent the plaintiff(s) from being heard on a legitimate cause of action"
such as the strict liability claim. (R. 753) The Court had denied plaintiff's July 19, 1985
motion to amend simply because plaintiffs had not furnished the verified statements
justifying the addition of new parties.

However, Judge Cornaby, like Diehl, had no

objection at that time to plaintiff's request to amend their complaint to add a strict
liability count.
Indeed, as his Honor obviously recognized, the amendment did no more than
permit plaintiffs to obtain whatever legal relief was justified by the facts already
established by discovery.

The amendment added nothing new to the factual issues; all

that was added was a new legal theory supported by the facts then in existence. In other
words, the case was tried on matters discovered before the amended complaint was filed.
Significantly, the record shows that far from being surprised at plaintiffs'
amendment, Diehl had always been aware of their intention to pursue a strict liability
claim. After plaintiffs initially sought to add strict liability, Diehl immediately filed a
cross-claim against Colonial with respect to the strict liability claim. (R. 242-43) Diehl
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alleged it was entitled to recovery from Colonial under strict liability because Diehl
"acted, if at all, only as an intermediate purchaser-seller in the chain of distribution."
(R. 242) This cross-claim was on file at the time of plaintiffs' amendment in June of
1987; it had not been withdrawn.

In denying that it was a link in the "chain of

distribution" Diehl had notice throughout this litigation of Plaintiff's intention to pursue
a strict liability claim.

It is therefore absurd for Diehl to assert that it lacked fair

notice of plaintiffs 1 claim. (Applt. Br. p. 16)
Likewise, Diehl was not "unavoidably prejudiced".

In fact, there can be no

prejudice in allowing an amendment where the adverse party is given an adequate
opportunity to address the additional issue. See, Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee
Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 450 (1973). The trial Court allowed
Diehl three additional months to prepare for trial. During this time, Diehl could have
requested further discovery on the strict liability issue, but chose not to do so. Instead,
Diehl spent its time preparing and arguing a motion for summary judgment on strict
liability based upon matters discovered prior to the amendment.
Nor was Diehl's burden in preparing its defense any greater after
amendment than before.

(Applt. Br. p. 17)

the

Diehl claims that it required little trial

preparation before the amendment because plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to
proceed on the negligence and breach of implied warranty counts.

Diehl points to a

statement made at a pre-trial hearing on October 13, 1987, in which plaintiffs 1 counsel
informed the court they had elected not to proceed under negligence or breach of implied
warranty. However, this statement was made months after the amended complaint was
filed.
At the time of the amendment, and before then, plaintiffs were also pursuing
both a negligence and an implied breach of warranty claim against Diehl.

Moreover,

Diehl had cross-claims pending against both Colonial and Truswal at the time of the
amendment.

Prior to the amendment, Diehl still had to prepare for trial on plaintiffs'

complaint and its cross-claims.

Any important witnesses or documents which Diehl
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needed from Colonial or Truswal should have been located and obtained earlier by Diehl
through discovery. Moreover, because Gary Diehl later worked for Diehl, it would have
been quite a simple matter for Diehl to locate witnesses from Truss Teck either before
or after the amendment. Indeed, Diehl had an engineering expert at trial to present its
case.
More to the point, however, is the fact that Diehl's defense — although
without merit — has been the same ever since Diehl filed its cross-claim against Colonial
in August, 1985, to wit: that Diehl was only an intermediate purchaser-seller of trusses
in the chain of distribution, i.e., a broker, and therefore was not liable to plaintiffs under
the doctrine of strict liability. In short, Diehl knew of its defense long before the trial
court formally allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
Equally specious is Diehl's claim that had plaintiffs amended their complaint
sooner, Diehl could have sought contribution or indemnity from Truss Teck. Diehl had
earlier filed cross-claims seeking contribution or indemnity from other parties in the
chain of distribution, such as Truswal and Colonial. Diehl could have, but chose not to,
file any cross-claim for contribution or indemnity against Truss Teck.

The reason is

obvious. Truss Teck was owned by Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the owner of
Diehl Lumber. By the time of the truss failure in 1984, Diehl had purchased Truss Teck's
manufacturing assets, obtained its business records, and was employing Gary Diehl and
manufacturing trusses itself. (Tr. 301-02) Larry Diehl simply decided not to sue his own
son.
However, had Diehl chosen to seek contribution from Truss Teck, it was not
bound by the statute of limitations applying to the underlying primary action, as Diehl
erroneously claims. (Applt. Br. p. 18) Utah follows the majority rule, which holds that a
statute of limitations applicable to the underlying primary action does not affect a joint
tortfeasor's right to seek contribution.

See, Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689

P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984); See also, Kutner, Contribution Among Tortfeasors:

The

Effects of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations, 33 Okla. L. Rev. 203
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(1980). The rationale for this holding is that a right of contribution does not accrue until
a defendant pays more than his share of the common liability. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of
LaVerkin, supra, 689 P.2d at 1346. Simply put, Diehl could have filed a contribution
action against Truss Teck, if it wanted to.
Finally, Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) and Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983), cited by Diehl, arise under circumstances very
different from those at bar. (Applt. Br. p. 16-17)
In Westley, the Court affirmed the denial of leave to amend where the
plaintiff had learned of the existence of a new allegation in a deposition, but waited a
year before seeking an amendment.

Unlike Westley, plaintiffs here acted diligently in

seeking leave to amend in July of 1985, and in good faith believed that their complaint
had been amended.
Similarly, the decision in Girard is inapplicable. There, the Court found that
leave to amend was properly denied where the motion was made on the day of the trial
and sought to add a new and different cause of action. Here, plaintiffs1 motion was made
before trial, and the strict liability count added nothing new to the factual issues that
had been developed prior to the amendment.
Diehl has failed to show that it was "unavoidably prejudiced" by the
amendment of plaintiffs1 complaint.

The trial court exercised its discretion in the

furtherance of justice in allowing plaintiffs' motion to amend, and its order allowing this
amendment should be affirmed.
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II.
THE JURYfS VERDICT AND JUDGMENT HOLDING DIEHL STRICTLY
LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
DEFECTIVE ROOF TRUSSES IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
A.
The Jury's Finding That Diehl Was
A Broker Between Colonial Lumber And Truss Teck
For The Truss Sale Involved In This Case Is
Supported By Substantial Evidence
It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence and make findings of fact. Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d
427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965) Thus, a party claiming that the evidence does not support a
jury's verdict carries a heavy burden.

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah

1985) Where the evidence is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, a court on
review will not upset findings of fact except upon as showing that the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, so clearly preponderates in appellant's favor
that reasonable persons could not differ on the outcome of the case. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc,
667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983)
There must be no mistake. The deposition testimony of Bruce Hiller, Diehl's
chief financial officer, constitutes substantial evidence that Diehl was a broker between
Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for the truss sale involved in this case.
Hiller made clear that Diehl Lumber is engaged in both the wholesale and
brokered sale of lumber products. Thirty-five to fifty percent of Diehl's gross revenues
were derived from the business of brokering products. Its business in brokering trusses
was so extensive that it was treated as a separate type of sale on Diehl's sale invoices.
(Tr. 344) Category "3" constituted "brokerage sales of trusses", such as the trusses used
in the construction of the Fairway warehouse roof. (Id.)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 was a Diehl invoice showing the sale of the roof trusses
to Colonial Lumber on July 31, 1979. (PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570) This invoice shows that this
sale of trusses fell into "sales Category "3" — the category used by Diehl Lumber for the
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brokerage sale of roof trusses. (Id., Tr. 344) Bruce Hiller explained that Diehl acted as a
broker in the sale of these trusses:
Q*

". . . [T]here were some trusses sold to Colonial Lumber in accordance
with Exhibit No. (11) which has an invoice date of July 31, 1979, . . .
now describe for me the process that would have taken place in the
ordering of that and how Diehl Lumber ordered and where they got the
trusses from and how the order was filled and the billing.
* * *

A.

To the best of knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979, if an
order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to have
go to another company such as the one who manufactured trusses.
That company would deliver them. We would broker trusses for a
company and do the billing and sometime ship trusses in our trucks with
other materials as a convenience and take a broker commission. . . .

Q.

So if someone called you, say, Colonial Lumber called and wanted to
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would
then refer them to another company?

A,

We would refer them to the manufacturer.

Q.

In this instance who were you brokering trusses for in 1979?

A*

Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc.11 (Tr. 339-40)

Furthermore, Hiller was not confused about Diehl's role as a broker in the sale
of roof trusses, as Diehl maintains in its brief.

(Applt. Br. pp. 34-39)

Any alleged

"confusion" by Hiller at trial resulted from his attempt at prevarication — to cover-up
Diehl's actual role in the sale of these roof trusses. The jury was able to see through this
ruse.
Hiller understood the concept of a brokered sale "within the lumber
industry". (Tr. 332-33) He understood Diehl's role in brokering building products as one
in which Diehl would arrange the sale of a product between the manufacturer and a
buyer.

(Tr. 362)

Diehl always profited from its brokerage efforts by charging a

brokerage fee which ranged between 4% and 12%, depending upon what its competition
was charging for similar sales. (Tr. 359)
The brokered sale of a roof truss was handled in much the same way. Diehl
would arrange a sale of trusses by bringing together the buyer with a manufacturer. At
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times Diehl would even deliver the trusses in its own trucks. (Tr. 339-40) Diehl likewise
profited from its efforts by taking a brokerage fee of 5% or "a little better" of the gross
truss sales figure, regardless of the amount of the sale. (Tr. 312, 358) Diehl's 5% fee
was deducted from the amount owing to Truss Teck, and in this respect it acted also as a
sales agent for Truss Teck.

In short, Diehl's role in brokering roof trusses was no

different then its role in brokering other building products, except for the fact that as a
sales agent it was somewhat less neutral in brokering Truss Teck's product.
Moreover, Diehl processed the sales transaction as a broker, and not merely a
bookkeeper, as the jury also correctly found. Unlike a bookkeeper, Diehl was taking a
percentage of each truss sale rather than making a hourly charge.

It cost the same

amount for Diehl Lumber to process an invoice that was $3,000 as it did for one that was
$30,000; its 5% fee thus for no relationship to that cost. In other words, Diehl Lumber
was taking a typical brokerage commission for its efforts in arranging the sale of roof
trusses, such as the sale between Truss Teck and Colonial Lumber. Furthermore, Diehl
used its own sales invoices in collecting payment for the trusses; a bookkeeper would
have used Truss Teck's invoices.

(PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570)

In short, Diehl was not an

automatic data processing company which merely handled Truss Teckfs

account

receivables. Diehl was a broker arranging a sale of trusses by bringing buyer and seller
together for a fee, as the Court instructed the jury. (R. 1359)
But there was more to Diehl's role as a broker than just this. Diehl was in
fact intimately involved in marketing the sale of trusses manufactured by Truss Teck.
Diehl has been in the Lumber business for many years.

It is a "substantial

company with a well established sales record". (Tr. 297) Diehl's gross revenues of $39
million established not only that it owned a major share of the lumber market in the
intermountain region, but had developed a well satisfied clientele that came to rely and
trust upon Diehl's judgment in lumber and building matters.
Diehl had a special relationship with Truss Teck. Truss Teck was owned by
Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the president of Diehl Lumber. Gary Diehl had
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studied accounting for only two years in college. He had no engineering background nor
previous background in the lumber business.

Yet, at the age of 24, he wanted to get

"involved in the manufacture of roof trusses." (Tr. 295) He "wanted to get a business
started", and his father helped him. (Tr. 297)
Truss Teck got off to a tremendous start.

In 1979, after only one year of

operation, Truss Teck had grossed sales of more than $100,000.

In another year, it

generated over $200,000 in gross revenue. (Tr. 298-99) This phenomenal growth in sales
for a fledgling business was not attributable to Gary Diehlfs business acumen in the
lumber industry — he left the lumber business in 1984 to manage tanning salons.
(Tr. 294) Rather, Truss Teek's growth in business was attributable to Diehl Lumber. As
Bruce Hiller explained, when a truss customer called Diehl Lumber for trusses, it was
Diehl's procedure to refer the truss customer to Truss Teck.

(Tr. 339-40)

In reality,

Diehl was doing more than just acting as a broker in arranging the sale of trusses; it was
in fact promoting a product — Truss Teck trusses — a product Diehl knew its customers,
like Colonial, would purchase on its recommendation because of the Diehl name.
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Diehl was a broker
between Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for the truss sales involved in this case.
Indeed, Diehl was not only arranging this sale; it was, in fact, marketing and promoting
this product.
B.
DiehTs Active Participation In the Chain
Of Distribution That Carried The Defective Truss Teck
Trusses To End-Users Subjects It To Strict Liability In Tort
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979),
this Court adopted strict liability in tort as embodied in Sec. 402(A) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. That section states, in relevant part, that:
"(1) One who sells any product in the defective condition unreasonable
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer or user, or to his
property if
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(a) seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product. . . .
(Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402(A))
The comments to the Restatement, which this Court has relied upon in the
past, describes the purpose of the rule of strict liability as:
"the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public
undertaken by one who enters into the business of supply human beings with
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the
forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such
goods." (Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402(A) comment g (1965)).
In view of the remedial purposes of the rule, the Courts have interpreted the
term "seller" in section 402A broadly, finding that sellers comprise all parties who
participate in moving the defective product through the chain of production, marketing
and distribution. See, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Co., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d
179, 182 (1982); Jordon v. Sunnyslope Appliance, Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 135
Ariz. App. 309, 660 P.2d 1236, 1241-42 (1983); Hammond v. North American Asbestos
Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983); Dewberry v. LaFollette, 598 P.2d 241,
242-43 (Okla. 1979); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d
401, 404 (1969).
Indeed, the Court's have specifically found that liability under section 402A
2

does not depend upon whether there was actual sales transaction,

•

.

recognizing that it

would not be reflective of business reality to restrict the application of section 402A to
only those defendants who are sellers in the technical sense.

See, e.g., Whitfield v.

Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47, 298 A.2d 50, 52 (1972); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472
Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736, 738-39 (Pa. 1977); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d
1

See, Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380, 381 n.2 (Utah 1982)
(Applying Restatement Sec. 402(A) and comment g)

2

The Courts have soundly rejected Diehl's bald assertion that the definition of
"sale" under Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the scope of Sec.
402(A). See, e.g., Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 806, 808-10 (S.C. App.
1986)
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738, 742 (Ind. App. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Air Craft Co., 365 So.2d
966, 967-68 (Ala. 1978); Bounds v. Joslyn Mfg. Supply Co., 660 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69
(S.D. Miss. 1986); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Co., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179,
182-87 (1982); Hoffman v. Loos 6c Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349,
1353-55 (1982); Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d
210, 216-17 (1983); Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 588-89
(1985); Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 261, 341 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1986); Weber v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (D.N.J. 1986).
There are, instead, other unique members of the American business scene
who, while not sellers in the technical sense, nonetheless occupy a significant position in
the marketing and distribution process, such as:
—

lessors (Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Service Co., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736
(Pa. 1977));

—

bailors (Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 261, 341 S.E.2d 806 (1986));
importers (Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d
774 (1975));
distributors (Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584,
588-89 (1985));
brokers (Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195,
454 N.E.2d 210 (1983)); Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp.
285 (D.N.J. 1986))

—

order-takers (Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452
A.2d 1349 (1982))

—

commercial licensors (Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 420 (1970)).

Because these parties are in the business of supplying and marketing consumer products,
i.e. moving products through the stream of commerce, they likewise have assumed a
special responsibility towards the consuming public. See, Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck
Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1977). Thus, the imposition of liability on these parties is
justified on the ground that their position in the marketing process enables them to exert
pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the product. See, e.g. Hammond
v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983)
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The decisions in Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195,
454 N.E.2d 210 (1983), Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349
(1982), Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199 704 P.2d 584 (1985), and Weber v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986) are instructive.
In Hammond, defendant was a broker/agent for Cape Asbestos Corp. (Cape),
which mined asbestos fiber in South Africa for sale world wide. Defendant was a contact
point in North America for Cape customers, and primarily functioned as a message relay
center between Cape and Cape's North American asbestos customers.

In acting as an

agent/broker for Cape, defendant received a 2-1/2% commission on all asbestos sales.
(454 N.E.2d at 214)

Defendant was held liable to plaintiff under strict liability for

injuries plaintiff suffered due to asbestos exposure. On appeal, defendant argued it was
not a seller as contemplated by Sec. 402(A) because it only acted as a broker by
facilitating and and servicing Cape's asbestos sales contracts.

Defendant

further

contended it never had control over the asbestos. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
these contentions concluding that "defendant's role in marketing the asbestos was
sufficient to support liability under a strict liability theory," because it acted as the sole
sales agent for Cape's product. (Id. at 216-17)
In Zamora v. Mobile Corp., a distributor of propane gas bought propane from a
manufacturer and sold it to a retailer who delivered the propane directly to the
consumer. The distributor never had possession or control of the propane. "It bought and
sold the gas completely as a paper transaction" and, in effect, was a broker of propane
gas.

(704 P.2d at 587)

At issue was the legal effect of the distributor's role in the

marketing the propane gas. The Washington Supreme Court held that the distributor was
a member of the chain of distribution and therefore subject to strict liability and tort.
The Court reasoned that the policies underlying the imposition of strict liability justified
its imposition where the distributor had some identifiable role in placing the propane on
the market:
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ft

[T]he policies underlying the imposition of strict liability justify its
imposition in this case. The primary policy justification recognized by this
Court for the extension of strict liability to all sellers in the chain of
distribution is the provision of the 'maximum protection 1 to the consumer.
* * *

That policy rationale is as applicable to sellers who never handle or control
the product as it is to those sellers who do possess of control the product. In
either case consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered by the
Court.
* * *

[T]he degree of a seller's participation in the marketing process is less
important . . . then the public protection consideration where, as here, a seller
has had some identifiable role in placing the defective product on the
market.
Accordingly, based upon the literal terms of Sec. 402(A) and upon the public
protection rationale for a broad interpretation of that section, we find that
(the distributor) is appropriately included within the chain of distribution of
the propane sold
" (704 P.2d at 589
In Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (Pa.
Super. 1982) the defendants were the manufacturer and distributors of linseed oil.
Plaintiff brought suit after she and her family were injured in a fire caused by the
product. One defendant, the E. F. Kaufmann Company, claimed it was not liable under
402(A) because of its limited role in the product's distribution. Although it received a
commission for its efforts, Kaufmann did nothing more than take orders for the
manufacturer — it took neither title to nor possession of the oil at any time during the
sale. (452 A.2d at 1350, 1352 n.2.) Despite the fact that Kaufmann never had exercised
direct control over the product, however, the Court imposed liability, concluding that
Kaufmann was "directly involved" in the business of supplying linseed oil. (Id. at 1354-55)
In Weber v. Johns-Manville, 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986), the defendant,
Pacor, Inc. acted as a broker — "a voice over the phone" — arranging the purchase and
sale of asbestos. Its brokerage service was an isolated and limited feature of its overall
business. (630 F. Supp. at 286, 288) It did not deliver the asbestos, but it did generate an
invoice for the product.

The Court nonetheless found Pacor strictly liable in tort

because it was in the business of placing the product into the stream of commerce:
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"Although (Pacor) may indeed have rendered a largely ministerial service, the
record indicates that Pacor was more than a mere blind order-taker. Pacor
was intimately involved in the asbestos industry for a number of years . . .
Pacor was not an unsophisticated plyer of the trade. . . .
* * *

[W]hether considered a seller, distributor, or a provider of services (Pacor)
arranged and profited from the supply of . . . asbestos . . .
Pacor has caused itself to 'become part of the overall producing and
marketing enterprise. 1 (citation omitted) Its connection with the asbestos
products, remote though it may be in comparison with that of other links in
the chain, is a factual reality." (630 F. Supp. 289)
Diehl's role as a broker and sales agent for Truss Teck was no different than
the roles played by these defendants. Diehl was in the business of making brokered sales
of roof trusses. Half of its gross revenues were derived from its brokered sales of such
trusses, and other building products. Diehl arranged the sale of roof trusses by bringing
the truss buyers and Truss Teck together, and at times shipped the trusses in its own
trucks to the customer. Diehl profited from its efforts by taking a 5% brokerage fee on
the sale of trusses, regardless of the amount of the sale. Like the defendants in Zamora
and Hoffman, Diehl's role was more entreprenunial than neutral; it was directly involved
in the business of placing roof trusses into the stream of commerce, and thus owed a
special responsibility to the consuming public.
But there was more to Diehl's role than this. Like the defendants in Hammond
and Weber, Diehl was also part of the overall enterprise of marketing and distributing
Truss Teck trusses.
Diehl has been intimately involved in the lumber business for many years. Its
large share of the market — $39 million in 1979 — demonstrated that many customers
had come to rely upon its judgment in lumber and building matters. Diehl moreover was
not an unsophisticated plyer of the trade — it knew about lumber products and it knew
about lumber roof trusses.

The fact that Diehl was able to immediately begin

manufacturing trusses after Gary Diehl quit his business demonstrates Diehl's familiarity
with this product.
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Diehl had a unique and long-standing relationship with Truss Teck. Truss Teck
was owned by Lawrence Diehl's son, and Diehl Lumber was helping Truss Teck get started
in the business.

One of these ways that Diehl helped Truss Teck was by promoting its

product — roof trusses. As Hiller admitted Diehl had a policy regarding truss referrals —
sell Truss Teck trusses. (Tr. 339-40) DiehPs motive was not merely altruistic; the more
customers Diehl sent to Truss Teck, the more times Diehl was able to take its 5% fee on
the sale. In other words, Diehl was not a "blind order-taker"; Diehl was in the market
pushing Truss Teck trusses on the market for its own financial advantage and that of its
offspring — Truss Teck, Inc.
Diehl was also quite successful in promoting this product. Truss Teck had a
phenomenal sales growth for a new business. Diehl obviously had many customers, such
as Colonial Lumber, that relied upon its judgment regarding Truss Teck's products; and
why not. Diehl was a trusted name in lumber and building products. It put its name on
the referral to Truss Teck just as it put its name on the sales invoices for the trusses. As
Diehl's customers obviously believed, Diehl would not stand behind a product unless it
knew it was the best product on the market.
Diehl had the kind of relationship with Truss Teck which justifies the
imposition of strict liability. See, e.g. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97
111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d at 210, 216-17 (1983)

Diehl's position in the marketing and

distribution process enabled it to exert pressure on Truss Teck to build a safe truss.
Diehl either could have stopped promoting the product, or more simply, Lawrence Diehl
could have made sure that his son Gary was manufacturing a good and safe truss. Diehl
was an expert in the lumber field; it had a unique opportunity to influence the
manufacture of Truss Teckfs trusses.
Diehl's efforts to promote Truss Teck's product demonstrates that it played a
significantly active part in the marketing and distribution of trusses. Its connection with
the product is a factual reality, and its promotional efforts were instrumental to Truss
Teck's sales success.

In short, Diehl's active participation in the chain of distribution
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that carried the defective Truss Teck trusses to end-users subjects it to strict liability in
tort.
C.
The Trial Court Properly Instructed The Jury
As To The Law Of Strict Liability In Tort
The trial court charged the jury with respect to the law of strict products
liability as follows:
"The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as
all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable for damages
caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long as the party is in
the business of, and gains profit from, distributing or otherwise disposing of
the product in question through the stream of commerce. The primary
justification for extending strict liability to all in the chain of distribution is
to provide the 'maximum of protection 1 to the consumer. This policy is as
applicable to those who never handle or control the product, as it is to those
who do possess or control the product. In either case, consumer protection is
the ultimate factor considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of
the product is not a prerequisite to the imposition of strict liability."
Diehl raised only three objections at trial to this instruction. (R. 1349) Diehl
objected to those portions of the instruction stating that the primary justification of
strict liability was "the maximum of protection" to the consumer, and that consumer
protection was the ultimate factor to be considered. Diehl also objected to that portion
which stated that the policy underlying strict liability was applicable to those who never
or control the product. (Tr. 450-51)
It should be clear that Diehl's objections lacked merit.

The instruction

correctly stated the law of strict products liability, as that law is applied nationwide.
The primary policy justification for strict liability is the provision of the "maximum of
protection" to the consumer. Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584,
588-89 (1985) Moreover, that policy rationale is as applicable to those parties, such as a
broker like Diehl, who never handle or control the product as it is to those who do possess
or control the product.

In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor

considered by the courts. Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 704 P.2d at 589; See, e.g., Hammond
v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216-17 (1983)
-35-

Indeed, Diehl never explained below why this instruction misstated the law.
(Tr. 450-51) Diehl's boilerplate objections, that these portions misstated the law, without
discussing what specific law was misstated, were insufficient to preserve this assignment
of error. See, Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D, Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860-61
(Utah 1983).

In its brief on appeal, Diehl now improperly attempts to expand on its

generalized objections by making certain so called "policy" arguments. (Applt. Br. pp.
20-32) As at trial, no case law is cited for its "policy" statements. This is not surprising,
as Diehl's assertions are without merit.

They are, in fact, no more than a diatribe

against the law of strict liability which this Court adopted in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
The following is typical of a Diehl "policy" argument against the imposition of
strict liability in this case:
"Why don't we say the plaintiff always wins, save the litigation costs and use
the dough to pay the homeless and hungry? We could have some nonadversarial summary process to keep out the patently frivolous claims.
Justice will be done on average and much more cheaply." (Applt. Br. p. 32)
This statement represents a gross misunderstanding of the reason why the rule of strict
liability was created. It "was created judicially because of the economic and social need
for the protection of consumers. . . . Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d
152, 157 (Utah 1979), quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 383-84 (1978). The rule was properly imposed upon Diehl simply because:
Diehl was actively involved for profit in brokering, marketing and
distributing Truss Teck trusses; and,
—

Diehl occupied a position where it could exert pressure on Truss Teck
to manufacture a good and safe truss.

Simply put, Diehl assumed a special responsibility towards the consuming
public, including plaintiffs, by actively participating in the business of placing products
into commerce. There is no good public policy reason that would justify allowing Diehl
to evade that special responsibility.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFFS
TO INTRODUCE RELEVANT EVIDENCE OF DIEHL'S GROSS
REVENUES AND DIEHL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
TRUSS TECK, INC. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
ITS STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM
Diehl complains that the trial Court erred in allowing plaintiffs to introduce
evidence of its wealth.

(Applt. Br. p. 39)

This is inaccurate.

Plaintiffs were only

allowed to introduce evidence of Diehl!s gross revenue 1979 in in order to show its size
and sophistication in the lumber industry, not its wealth. (Tr. 330-31)
This

evidence

was relevant

to plaintiffs'

strict

liability

claim.

It

demonstrated that Diehl had developed a satisfied clientele that trusted in its judgment,
and would do so when Diehl promoted the purchase of Truss Teck trusses. The evidence
further demonstrated that Diehl had the economic muscle to exert pressure on Truss
Teck to enhance the safety of its product.

Simply put, this evidence was germane to

plaintiffs' claim that Diehl played an active role in the chain of distribution of Truss
Teck's product justifying the imposition of strict liability. Indeed, the fact that Diehl
does no more in its brief than make a boilerplate objection that this evidence was just
"irrelevant", shows that it does not seriously dispute the point that this evidence was
pertinent to plaintiffs' claim.
Furthermore, while Diehl now contends on appeal that this evidence was
prejudicial, the record shows that Diehl did not object to this evidence on this ground at
trial. (Tr. 330-31) Diehl has therefore failed to preserve this claim for review. Utah R.
Evid. 103; See, Stagmeyer v. Leatham, 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968) (A party
must state a specific ground for objection to preserve the issue for review) In any event,
the relevancy of the evidence outweighed any alleged prejudice to Diehl. See, State v.
Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979)
Moreover, because this evidence was relevant, it was unnecessary for the trial
Court to give a corrective instruction to the jury regarding Diehl's gross revenues. The
refusal to give an instruction is not a basis for reversal unless it appears that the jurors
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were confused or misled and the error was prejudicial, and there can be no prejudicial
error where the tendered instruction was covered by other instructions. See, Stratton v.
Nielsen, 25 Utah 2d 124, 477 P.2d 152, 153 (1970) In the present case, the jury was
instructed as to plaintiffs1 burden of proof, to consider the instructions as a whole
without singling out any specific instruction or portion of that instruction, and to "weigh
and consider this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or against
any party to the action." (R. 1340-41, 1349) Thus, it cannot be said that the jury did not
understand the specific relevant purpose for which the evidence was introduced:

to

demonstrate that defendant Diehl was a participant in the chain of distributing trusses.
Diehl also claims that evidence at transcript pages 291-302, 309, 314-21, 32425, 331-32, 353-54 was improperly admitted to show its liability under a successor
liability theory.

(Applt. Br. p. 41)

There are several serious flaws with Diehl's

argument.
First, the record is clear: plaintiffs1 claim that Diehl was strictly liable under
a successor liability theory was always a part of this case prior to trial, as Judge Cornaby
found in denying Diehl's motion for summary judgment:
"I cannot tell from what has been given me whether . . . its strictly
bookkeeping, just a service to Truss Teck, or is it a brokerage? I see it as a
question of fact. Its along with the successor liability. I think both of those
are things that bring it into question that you're going to have to present to a
jury. . . ." (Tr. of 10/20/87 at 15) (emphasis supplied)
Secondly, this evidence was relevant to plaintiffs1 strict liability claim that
Diehl played a major role in placing trusses into the stream of commerce. This evidence
described the relationship between Diehl and Truss Teck in the marketing and
distribution of trusses. Diehl's relationship with Truss Teck demonstrated that it actively
participated in the chain of distribution of trusses, and could have exerted pressure on
Truss Teck to manufacturer a good and safe truss.

It is this relationship that Diehl

wanted to keep hidden from the jury in its defense of the strict liability claim, and which
it has kept hidden from this Court in its brief.
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Finally, because this evidence was relevant to plaintiffs1 strict liability claim,
there was no need to give a corrective instruction concerning this evidence, as Diehl
speciously asserts.

Indeed, in as much as the record does not show that Diehl ever

requested the kind of corrective instruction referred to in its brief (See, Applt. Br, 41), it
has waived this point for appeal. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036, 1037
(Utah 1975)
There is a presumption in the verity of the verdict and judgment, including all
aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and rulings of the trial Court. Upon appeal,
appellant has the burden of showing there was substantial and prejudicial error which had
the effect of depriving him of the opportunity of a full and fair presentation and
consideration of the disputed issues.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.

Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974) No such error emerges from the instant record or
from Diehl's brief.
IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT TRUSWAL WAS NOT
AT FAULT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In its brief on appeal, Diehl makes two final arguments directed against
Truswal. These claims do not affect the jury verdict and judgment entered against Diehl
and in favor of plaintiffs since the verdict and judgment holding Diehl strictly liable to
plaintiffs for the damages caused by the defective roof trusses is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law. Nonetheless, for the convenience
of this Court, plaintiffs wish to point out certain inaccuracies in Diehl!s argument.
First, Diehl claims that the trial Court erred in dismissing its cross-claim
against Truswal. (Applt. Br. pp. 41-43) This is inaccurate. The record does not indicate
that any order was entered dismissing Diehl's cross-claim prior to trial. Moreover, at
trial, it was Truswal's counsel who elected not to participate in the trial based upon its
settlement with plaintiffs. (Tr. pp. 18-19)
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Secondly, Diehlfs assertion in its brief that it "expected to have any judgment
against it reduced by the greater of the amount of Truswal's fault or the amount paid by
Truswal in settlement and expected to have Truswal's fault determined at trial" is
misleading.

(Applt. Br. p. 42) Diehl was afforded the opportunity to fully litigate the

issue of Truswalfs fault at trial.

It simply produced no direct evidence to show that

Truswal was at fault.
With respect to Diehl's claim against Truswal, the Court instructed the jury
that Diehl had the burden of proving each of the following:
—

that Truswal provided design engineering to Truss Teck for the roof
trusses that failed;
that the design engineering provided by Truswal was used by Truss Teck
in its manufacture of the roof trusses;
that the design engineering by Truswal was unreasonably dangerous and
defective;
that the Truswal unreasonably dangerous and unsafe design engineering
was approximate cause of the roof collapse. (R. 1361)

The evidence was clear to the jury as it should be clear to this Court. Diehl
simply failed to produce any direct evidence that Truswal provided Truss Teck with any
design, much less an erroneous one, for the manufacture of the roof truss system. Diehl's
own expert, Vance Christenson, made this clear by explaining that he had never seen nor
reviewed any "design drawings that were . . . sent by any engineering firm to" Truss
Teck. (Tr. 408) If this was not enough, Diehlfs counsel made this point during his closing
argument:
"(Mr. Draney): Now, lastly before I finish, I would like to talk about Diehl
Lumber Company's claims against Truswal. Now, it's true that we don't have
the design in hand. . . . You know, we don't have designs. . . ." (Tr. 501)
Without a design, Diehl had no direct proof showing that Truswal was at fault.
Indeed, far from showing that Truswal was at fault, much of the evidence
pointed to Truss Teck and its "sloppy fabrication" of the trusses used in the roof on the
Fairway warehouse. (Tr. 190, 192-92, 197-98, 202-3) In fact, perhaps the most telling
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remark concerning Truss Teck!s fault was made by Mr. Gary Diehl, the former president
of Truss Teck. When shown Plaintiffs Exhibit 39 — part of the roof truss taken from the
scene of the collapse — Mr. Diehl remarked:

!,

I can see quite a bit wrong with that."

(Tr. 323)
There were no irregularities occurring during this trial. Substantial evidence
supports the jury's determination that Truswal was not at fault.

The amount paid in

settlement by Truswal has been deducted from the judgment entered against Diehl. The
entire judgment was correct and proper and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated and upon the authorities cited,

Plaintiff-

Respondent respectfully pray that the orders and judgment of the District Court be
affirmed.
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